From Brier, S. (2008) Cybersemiotics, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p. 12:

…we can see that inquiry is never disinterested. As Popper and Peirce point out, it is usually an answer to questions or problems. Truth is not merely socially determined, so it seems that the questions of what, how, and why are always intertwined. Nor is it simply a matter of what works (pragmatism) – for instance, to satisfy desire or relieve pain – or of maximizing happiness (utilitarianism). Furthermore, what counts as true is not a simple given essence, be it abstract ideas (Plato), mathematical laws (scientism), or phenomenological noumenial structures (Husserl). The problem is that knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of theories, which form concepts and categorizations, but knowledge also presupposes values. Conversely, knowledge of theories and values presupposes facts. The hermeneutical circles evolve into a spiral movement in understanding. Thus truth is a normative term as well as a descriptive one (Peirce). Simple correspondence between word and object – or sentence and state of affairs – provides very little explanatory force and value alone (correspondence theories of truth). Inquiry is never disinterested, so while facts in the world are of course a necessary feature of what it means to talk about the truth, there are always underlying ontological, epistemological, and axiological commitments in holding a term or sentence to be true. This is why Kuhn’s paradigm concept (rather, his discinplinary matrix) is a useful analytical tool in the philosophy and sociology of the sciences. But in my view (Brier 2005) it is not to be used to discourage the search for compatibility among the various ways of striving for publicly accessible and controllable meaning and knowledge.